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public policy of the forum; . . . or because the liability
imposed is deemed a penal one."3
Thus, laws giving rise to a right of action for death by
the wrongful act of another probably have no force and
effect beyond the jurisdiction of the state which enacts
them, except by comity of the other states-a comity which
may be denied in whole or in part, as evidenced by the
panorama herein presented of the law of Maryland on the
subject in the past decade.
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OF A NAVIGABLE
BOUNDARY RIVER
Barnes v. State'
Appellant who claimed to be a resident and voter of the
state of Virginia, was indicted by the grand jury of Prince
George's County, Maryland for committing rape on a citizen of Virginia. The crime took place on a steamboat running on the Potomac River en route from Norfolk, Virginia
to Washington, D. C. and passing through Prince George's
County, although at the time of the crime the evidence
showed that the boat was in the waters of adjacent Charles
County.
Appellant filed a plea to the jurisdiction to which the
State's demurrers were sustained. The appellant was then
tried and convicted. After conviction he filed a motion in
arrest of judgment but this was overruled and he was sentenced to be hanged. The Court of Appeals affirmed judgment without costs and a petition for writ of certiorari
was
2
denied by the United States Supreme Court.
31 Bradford Elec. Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 160 (1932), cited in Fuller,
Trustee v. Rock, 125 Ohio St. 36, 180 N. E. 367 (1932); See also Ross,

supra, n. 25.

On the subject of penal statutes, it might be pointed out that Robinson
v. Norato, 71 R. I. 256, 43 A. (2d) 467 (1945) (overruled on other grounds
by Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386 (1947)), held that a statute allowing
triple damages to the complainant for overceiling charges by a vendor of
goods was a penal statute in the international sense. It is submitted that
this is a departure from the accepted concept of what constitutes a penal
statute in that sense. The Testa case specifically refused to rule on the
point.
-Since the limitation in that statute under consideration is procedural, it
effectively bars application of the effect of a substantive right under a
foreign statute that might otherwise be recognized by Maryland.
147

A. (2d) 50 (Md. 1946).

* Barnes v. State of Md., 329 U. S. 754 (1946).
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The instant case raises important questions concerning
the concurrent jurisdiction of the courts in cases of crimes
committed on a navigable river, as between two counties
within a given state which border the river, and as between two states whose boundary is the river.
The appellant denied that the Circuit Court for Prince
George's County had jurisdiction to enter judgment on
the basis of two principal contentions:' First, because the
record failed to show that the defendant was brought before a Justice of the Peace in Prince George's County,
under the provisions of Section 631 of Article 27 of the Code
of Maryland, 1939, and the offense occurred outside Prince
George's County. Secondly, because the tenth article of
the Compact of 1785 between the States of Maryland and
Virginia which was still operative, entitled him to be tried
in a court of the State of Virginia.
The Court ruled that the State of Maryland had jurisdiction over the appellant properly exercised through the
Circuit Court for Prince George's County. In answer to
the first contention, the Court held that by a reasonable
construction of Section 631, Article 27 of the Code, (a)
the statute was not intended to require a preliminary examination of the accused as necessary to give jurisdiction
to the Court in which a grand jury had indicted him; (b)
that such an allegation is not required to be shown on the
record; and (c) that the legislative intent was to give jurisdiction over an offender to the county which first used
the ordinary processes to hold him preliminary to indictment, thereby ousting the jurisdiction of another county
having concurrent jurisdiction to try the case.
As to the second contention the Court decided that the
Tenth Article of the Compact of 1785 between Maryland
and Virginia providing that certain offenses committed
on sections of the Potomac River where the boundary was
doubtful shall be tried in the state of the offender, became
inoperative when the boundary line was subsequently established with certainty; that the exclusive common law
territorial jurisdiction of Maryland over the Potomac
River remained with one exception, viz.: concurrent jurisdiction over violations of fishing laws was yielded to Virginia.
s Supra, n. 1, Appellant's brief and appendix, No. 120, 11, for Appellant.
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CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OF COUNTIES
Originally enacted April 10, 18804 with no subsequent
material changes, Section 631, Article 27 of the 1939 Code
provides:
"Any person who may commit an indictable offense
on a steamboat or railroad train within the State of
Maryland, may be presented, indicted, tried and convicted in any county or city from, to, or through which
the said boat or train may run, and on arrest be taken
before, and in the case of bailable offenses, be held to
bail by any justice of the peace in any such county or
city; but such presentment, indictment, and trial shall
be in the same county and city in which such justice
of the peace shall be."
By the first half of this statute, Maryland gives concurrent jurisdiction to the various counties from, to, or
through which may run the steamboat or train on which an
offense is committed. Thus, although the crime was actually perpetrated while the boat was in the waters of
adjacent Charles County, by this statute Prince George
County had concurrent jurisdiction. It is clear from the
code that if a person commits a crime on a steamboat within the state of Maryland, he may be tried in any county
or Baltimore City, from, to, or through which said steamboat may run.
It is concerning the construction of the latter section
of the statute that a problem arises. Appellant argued for
a strict construction which should require, as a condition
precedent to the acquisition of jurisdiction, that the accused must be taken before a justice of the peace of the
county in which the indictment is subsequently brought;
that compliance with this procedure is a necessary part
of the due process by which the offender is entitled to be
tried; that such is a jurisdictional allegation which must
show in the record. Since there was nothing in the record
to show the appellant was ever brought before a justice
of the peace anywhere before he was indicted, it was contended that the state could not prosecute in the circuit
court of Prince George's County under this statute.
The Court refused to take such a position. Justifying
a reasonably broad application of the statute, the Court
IMd. Laws, 1880, Ch. 485. It is understood that a proposal will be introduced in the General Assembly of 1949 to extend this concurrent jurisdiction also to crimes committed on highway busses and airplanes.
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cited prior decisions showing Maryland's adherence to the
well established rules of statutory construction which require such construction which best answers the makers'
intention which may be collected from the cause or necessity for passing the act or from foreign circumstances,
and "when discovered ought to be followed although such
construction may seem contrary to the letter of the
statute."5
Mode of Acquiring Jurisdiction-Necessity
of PreliminaryHearing
The Court recognized that the procedure of bringing
a person charged with a felony before a magistrate who
after a hearing or waiver of hearing holds the accused for
the action of the grand jury, is a customary practice in
Maryland. However, the Court was quick to point out
that it is not necessary to give jurisdiction to a court whose
grand jury has indicted.
In the instant case the Court did not cite previous decisions on the point. Nevertheless, it has long been the
rule in Maryland that prosecutions may be instituted in
the first instance by the grand jury without a preliminary
hearing before a magistrate.' In 1891 in the case of Blaney
v. State, the Court ruled squarely that "in this state grand
juries have plenary inquisitorial powers, and may lawfully themselves, and upon their own motion originate
charges against offenders though no preliminary proceedings have been had before a magistrate, and though neither
the court nor the State's Attorney has laid the matter before them."' This view, it was conceded, was in accordance with the English practice then obtaining, and was
generally accepted at the institution of the federal government. Subsequently, the Court affirmed this position in a
series of cases,8 the most recent prior to the present case
being that of Brack v. Wells in 1944.9
Thus in Maryland it is possible to start a criminal proceeding with investigation and indictment at the grand
jury level. The grand jury can indict someone who has
never been arrested. The grand jury then issues a bench
Supra, n. 1, 52.
'HOCHHEIMER,

THE LAW OF CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

(2nd

Ed.

1904) 101.
74 Md. 153, 156, 21 A. 547, 548 (1891).
8 In re Report of Grand Jury, 152 Md. 616, 137 A. 370 (1927) ; Colbenty
v. State, 164 Md. 558, 166 A. 45 (1933); Heitzelberger v. State, 173 Md.
435, 196 A. 288 (1937).
184 Md. 86, 40 A. (2d) 319 (1944).
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warrant, 0 a process issued by the court itself or "from
the bench", for the arrest of the accused, and a warrant of
commitment reciting the fact of indictment and describing
the crime."
In general, a grand jury may investigate and present
offenses without any preliminary examination and commitment of the accused, in the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary. In some states a grand jury's investigation is restricted to such offenses as are called to its
attention and directed by the court or prosecuting attorney. 3 In other states, as in Maryland, a grand jury has
plenary inquisitorial powers, and
may itself begin the pro4
ceedings against the accused.'
In the instant case, by a strict construction of the statute
it would follow that a preliminary hearing was required.
This would by implication limit the powers of the grand
jury to originate the charge. The Court, however, was
insistent that the legislative intent, based on general
practice and legal precedent in Maryland, was not to require a preliminary examination as a basic indispensable
fact without which a court in which a grand jury had returned an indictment could not acquire jurisdiction. This
is a more reasonable and natural construction.
Moreover, this decision is consonant not only with
state policy and a substantial body of respectable authority,
but it grows out of practical considerations. The general
rule is that no preliminary hearing of accused is necessary
where an indictment has been returned against him by
the grand jury.15 The preliminary examination is not a
trial, but a procedure whereby the magistrate determines
whether an offense has been committed and if there is
probable cause to hold the accused for trial. This serves
to prevent the escape of the guilty, detention of the innocent, and abuse of power.
A' 10 C. J. S. 246, n. 2; 22 C. J. S. Sec. 404.
11 Some jurisdictions early held similarly with Maryland, supra, n. 6,
101, 104, for citations of early cases. Connecticut held that a grand jury
had the right to originate charges against offenders without forewarning
them of the proceedings against them, State v. Walcott, 21 Conn. 272
(1851). Missouri concurred in Ward v. State, 2 Mo. 120 (1829).
1238 C. J. S. See. 34(c), n. 23; Sec. 34(d), n. 27.
1,Petition of McNair, 324 Pa. 48, 187 A. 498 (1936).
21People v. Doe, 272 N. Y. 473, 3 N. E. (2d) 875 (1936) ; 38 C. J. S. 1031,
n. 35.
15 22 C. J. S. Sec. 332; although under special circumstances the Court
may require such an examination for the purpose of bail, State v. Pichon,
148 La. 348, 86 So. 893 (1921).

19481

BARNES v. STATE

The right to a hearing, although recognized as a substantial right, generally is not a constitutional right, and is
granted only when required by statute. 6 In the absence
of statute, no preliminary hearing is necessary, the proceeding being unknown to the common law.17 The District Court for the Western District of Virginia in the case
of U. S. v. Averett s quoted the Maryland rule established
in Blaney v. State and stated that there is no "right" to a
preliminary hearing after indictment; that the formalities
and safeguards surrounding the action of the grand jury
seem to afford, in themselves, sufficient guaranties to constitute due process and to satisfy the early constitutional
amendments. The Court then flatly ruled that where an
indictment had been found against the accused by.a grand
jury, no preliminary hearing is necessary because the
legitimate purpose of the preliminary examination has
been accomplished by a tribunal of superior rank to that
of an examining magistrate.
In the instant case, under the facts, the offense is not
bailable. Thus, one of the essential purposes of a preliminary hearing, that of determining the bail, is not present.
When the indictment was returned against the appellant,
not only had it been decided that the offense had been committed, that there was sufficient evidence to hold him for
trial, but a further step had been taken, the form of the
charge had been definitely fixed. Therefore, there was no
practical or logical reason for a preliminary hearing. The
Court seemingly preferred not to construe the middle
clause separately,
"and on arrest be taken before, and in the case of bailable offenses be held to bail' ' by any justice of the peace
in any such county or city; )sa
but to consider it in the light of the terms of the entire
statute, and the legislative intent. The Court's broad construction is compelling.
Jurisdictionto Be Shown By Record
In deciding that the Statute did not require an entry
into the court records of such a preliminary hearing, 9
1 Ex Parte Gregory, 86 Ca. App. 10, 260 Pa. 320 (1927) ; See 22 C. J. S.
484, n. 19.
17 22 C. J. S. Sec. 332, n. 16.
"United States v. Averett, 26 F. (2d) 676, 678 (W. D. Va. 1928).
"s Md. Code (1939) Art. 27, Sec. 631.
"In Kane v. State, 70 Md. 546, 17 A. 557 (1889), and State v. Stafford,
160 Md. 385, 153 A. 77 (1931), the Court of Appeals ruled that in the case
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the Court reviewed trial procedures in Maryland. Under
normal circumstances where a crime has been committed
within the territorial limits of a given county, or where
a county has concurrent jurisdiction, there is nothing in
the records of the trial before the Circuit Court to show
any action prior to the grand jury. The proceedings start
with presentment and indictment. 0 The Court's inference
is that the legislative intent could not have been to require
such an allegation in the record.
It is interesting that the court considered it significant
that the appellant did not allege that he was not taken
before a justice of the peace in Prince George's County,
or that he was taken before a justice of the peace in a
county other than that in which he was indicted; but contended that the record did not show a preliminary hearing
was held. The implication is that the customary procedure
was followed. Therefore, in spite of the Court's pronouncement against the requirement of a preliminary hearing
and its entry"into the record under a similar fact situation,
in the light of the fact that few controversies have reached
the courts on this point, it could well be assumed that
the Court looks with favor on such a procedure, at least
as a precautionary measure, and2 1that it is almost inevitable
in Maryland trial proceedings.
Ouster of Jurisdiction
The Court indicated that the primary intent of the
latter section of the statute was to freeze the jurisdiction
in that county having concurrent jurisdiction which first
uses the ordinary processes to hold the offender preliminary to the indictment. 2
of magistrate's courts sitting in the exercise of a special and limited jurisdiction, it is well settled that there must be affirmative proof in support
of the regularity of the proceedings; in both cases, the fact that accused
was informed of his right to jury trial and elected to be tried before a
Justice of the Peace must affirmatively appear in the record.
20Supra, n. 1, 51.
21 An inquiry as to what actually took place in the instant case reveals
the following circumstances. The crime took place between 2:45 a.m. and
3:15 a.m. on August 4, 1945. At 3:40 a.m. the master of the boat was
notified, and with other officers and members of the naval patrol took into
custody the appellant, who was employed as a cook on the boat. He was
confined until the boat reached Washington, at which point the Metropolitan
Police detained him, supra, n. 3, 14. He was extradited from Washington.
The Justice of the Peace of Prince George's County placed his case on the
Magistrate's docket and issued a committment for him. However, it has
not been established that a formal hearing was ever held before the
Magistrate.
2 Supra, n. 1, 51.
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It is a well established rule, both under the statutes and
in the absence thereof, that where several courts have
concurrent jurisdiction of the same offense, the court
which first acquires jurisdiction of the prosecution retains
it to the exclusion of the others.2" The purpose of the rule
is to prevent confusion and conflicts in jurisdiction between the different courts, and to prevent a person from
being tried twice for the same offense.
The holding in the instant case is a recognition by the
Court of the legislative intent to make statutory provision for the application of what has been described as "the
doctrine of ouster of jurisdiction". 4 Similar provision is
made in other statutes. For example, crimes on the Chesapeake Bay, outside the body of any county, may be tried
in any county in which the accused is arrested or is first
brought; 25 crimes occurring near county lines, also may be
tried in that county which first assumes jurisdiction by
issuing process for the offender.2"
In 1935, the Court of Appeals recognized the rule of
"ouster of jurisdiction" in the case of Woodcock v. Woodcock." The Court held there that the prior filing of the
husband's suit for divorce a mensa et thoro in Wicomico
County, ousted the jurisdiction that existed in Baltimore
City for a similar suit by the wife.
CONCURRENT JuaisDIcrIoN AS BETwrE

STATES

On the question of the extent of Maryland's jurisdiction over the Potomac River, although this marked the
first time a case had been brought into this court under
section 631 of Article 27 in the sixty-eight years since its
enactment in 1880, and the first time under the Tenth
Article of the Compact since its enactment in 1785, the decision revealed a historic dispute between Virginia and
Maryland over their boundary waters. In ruling that
Maryland has exclusive criminal jurisdiction over offenses
committed against the person on the Potomac River, the
Court reviewed the history and background of the entire
Compact of 1785 between Maryland and Virginia.2 8
22 C. J. S. Sec. 111, n. 37.
Proper Venue of Suit for Alimony Without Divorce-Ouster of
Jurisdiction,-Amenment---Woodcock v. Woodcock, (1936) 1 Md. L. Rev. 85.
25 Md. Code (1939) Art. 27, Sec. 630.
26 Md. Code (1939) Art. 27, Sec. 632.
7 169 Md. 40, 179 A. 826 (1935).
" SCHARF, II HISTORY OF MARYLAND (1879) 528.
23

2Note,
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The Compact was preceded by a series of boundary disputes between Maryland and Virginia due to contradictory
charters granted to Lord Baltimore for Maryland and to
Lord Culpepper and the London Company for Virginia. As
to the Potomac, Maryland contended for the boundary line
at high water mark on the Virginia shore; Virginia argued
for low water mark. By joint legislative action in 1785,
which was consented to by Congress, the two states entered
into an agreement as to rights, obligations, and jurisdiction
over the waters,-although the boundary line had not been
agreed upon.
The seventh and eighth articles of the Compact provided for common fishing rights and the concurrent enactment of laws for the preservation of fish in the Potomac.
The Court reviewed decisions of Maryland, Virginia, and
the Federal Courts,2" and statutes enacted by the two
states"0 recognizing that these two articles are still effective. The Court conceded that Maryland yields to Virginia concurrent jurisdiction on the Potomac over violations of the fishing laws.
The tenth article of the Compact provides that in sections of the Chesapeake Bay and in the Potomac and Pocomoke Rivers "where the boundary is doubtful" there
should be concurrent jurisdiction over "piracies, crimes or
offenses", and that an offense committed by a citizen of one
state against a citizen of the other should be tried in the
courts of the state of which the offender was a citizen. The
appellant contended that this article was still operative, and
under it Maryland did not have jurisdiction over the appellant who was a Virginia resident.
Since the boundary line was still unsettled in 1785 when
the Compact was enacted, the Court holds that by the
tenth article concurrent jurisdiction was not yielded to Virginia over those parts of the waters which were admitted
by both states to belong to Maryland; that it was only intended in those sections which were uncertain." Further,
that as far as the extra-territorial rights predicated upon an
admiralty jurisdiction over navigable waters, i.e., "piracies", such jurisdiction ceased to exist with the adoption
of the Constitution of the United States and what remained
2

0 Middlekauf v. Le Compte, 149 Md. 621, 132 A. 48 (1926) ; Ex Parte
Ballinger, 88 F. 781, 782 (D. Va. 1882); U. S. v. Bevans, 16 U. S. 336
(1818) ; St. Clair v. United States, 154 U. S. 134 (1894).
80 Md. Code (1939) Art. 39, Sec. 65-74, and Md. Code Supp. (1947) Art.
72, Sec. 8; Va. Code 1942, Ch. 129, Sec. 3299 and Ch. 130, Sec. 3305, et 8eq.
31 Supra, n. 1, 58, 59; Ex parte Marsh, 57 F. 719, 731 (C. C. E. D. Va.
1893).
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was the common law jurisdiction which had continuously
been exercised by the counties of Maryland lying on the Potomac over offenses committed opposite their shores.12 The
Court then upheld the State's contention that when the two
states and Congress had consented to the Black Jenkins
Award of 1877,"3 by which the boundary line on the Potomac
was definitely fixed at the low water mark on the Virginia
shore, Virginia's jurisdiction over the offenses described in
the tenth article ceased by operation of law. Complete
jurisdiction as far as the tenth article was concerned remained in the Maryland Courts, because the boundary line
was no longer doubtful. The Court concluded that "when
the obvious reason for the agreement has been done away
with by the parties, that part of the agreement falls with
the subsequent change in the circumstances".
Maryland
therefore could properly exercise jurisdiction over the
appellant.
Additional support for this holding was secured by the
fact that while Maryland and Virginia have enacted concurrent fishing laws, indicating the intention of both states
to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over fishing act violations, on the other hand, the two states by affirmative
actions have mutually recognized Maryland's exclusive
jurisdiction over the offenses stated in the Tenth Article.
In 1819 Virginia repealed a statute which gave the General
Court of Virginia jurisdiction to try cases of crimes against
the person on the Potomac. Today, under the statutes and
decisions of Virginia there is no longer any Virginia court
with jurisdiction to try offenses on the Potomac other than
those under the concurrent fishing acts. But Maryland in
1880, close on the acceptance of the Black Jenkins Award,
passed the statute under which the instant case is brought,
and in 1908 enacted what is now Section 161 of Article 75,
1939 Code which emphasizes that the jurisdiction of the
counties lying on the river extends to the ultimate limits
of the state (low water mark on the Virginia shore).
Decisions of Virginia, Maryland, and the Federal Courts
were cited and interpreted by the Court as further indications of the understanding between the two states. 5
An interesting aspect of the decision in the instant case
is the delineation between offenses against the person, i.e.,
32 Supra, n. 1, 61.
83

Maryland v. West Virginia, 217 U. S. 577 (1910).

31 Supra, n. 1, 61-62.
35 Biscoe v. State, 68 Md. 294, 12 A. 25 (1887); Farewell v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 475, 189 S. E. 321, 323 (1937) ; Dx parte Marsh, 8upra, n. 34.
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rape, and offenses against the state, i.e., violations of the fishing laws. While the Court does not debate the point, there
is quoted with seeming approval the distinction of the U. S.
Supreme Court, in Wharton v. Wise 6 that violations of the
fishing acts were offenses against the state over which Virginia has jurisdiction, whereas the tenth article referred to
offenses against the person. This means then that the
seventh and eighth articles of the Compact which refer to
''offenses against the state" are still operative; and the tenth
article which refers to "offenses against the person" is no
longer effective."
Comparisonof Maryland'sExclusive Jurisdiction
In general, where a navigable river forms the boundary
between two states, if the original property in the bed of
the river was in neither, the territorial boundary is the
middle of the main channel of the river.8 8 For example,
prior to the Revolution, the title to the bed and channel of
the Delaware River remained in the British Crown. After
the Revolution, all the rights of the Crown were vested in
the several states, so that the title of New Jersey and
Pennsylvania extended from their shores to the middle of
the river. 9
Where one state is the original proprietor of the territory through which the river flows, and grants territory
on one side of the river only, it retains the river within its
own domain and the territorial boundary of the state
created extends to the river only."0 This is the position of
states bordering the Ohio River. The territory Virginia
ceded to the United States out of which the state of Indiana
was formed, was "northwest of the Ohio River". Kentucky
succeeded to the rights and possessions of Virginia as they
existed when she was admitted to the Union. Therefore,
when Kentucky became a state, her boundary extended to
36 153

U. S. 155 (1894).
An extensive study of the Compact prepared by the Maryland Legislative Council concludes that the Compact though still existing in its original
form, continues to control only the fishing rights of citizens of both states
in the lower Potomac River; that the other sections are no longer effective
because of being superseded by the Federal Constitution, and by judicial
constructions and restrictions in the Courts of Maryland, Virginia, and the
Federal Government, see Compact of 1785, Research Report No. 26, submitted Sept. 1946 by Carl N. Everstine, Research Division, Legislative
Council of Maryland.
38 Note, Jurisdiction over Boundary Rivers, 65 L. R. A. 954, 5.
39 Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter, 61 Pa. 21 (1869) ; see also State v. Davis.
25 N. J. Law 386 (1856).
,0 59 C. J. Sec. 26.
17
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the low water mark on the north side of that river, i.e., the
low water mark on the Indiana shore."'
In some states where the boundary is the center of the
river, this determines the extent of the criminal jurisdiction of the states. By an interstate compact entered into
in 1856 between New Jersey and Delaware, each state has
jurisdiction both civil and criminal to the middle of the
river; thus, the commission of an offense on the river becomes a question of fact for the jury. Accordingly, it
was held by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in 1919 that
where the offense was committed well to the east of the
middle line, it was
within the jurisdiction of the easterly
42
state, New Jersey.
However, with the majority of the states whose boundary line is the center of a navigable river, by constitutional
provision, by Act of Congress, by compact between the
states, or by tacit agreement, criminal jurisdiction is concurrent over the river,43 because of the well recognized
difficulty of determining the location of particular acts with
reference to such line, and to prevent the river from becoming a place of lawlessness.4 4 Concurrent jurisdiction seems
to be favored by Congress, and in creating territories and
states, it has been voluntarily inserted in the organizing
acts of Congress and forced upon many states. 45 The rule
of ouster of jurisdiction also is the usual practice."
It reasonably follows then that where one of two states
bordering a river can show title to the entire stream, it
may extend its laws over the entire water and enforce them
to the same extent as it can upon the land. 47 The decision
of the Maryland Court of Appeals in the instant case is a
logical ruling, for all of the Potomac River is within the

"

Indiana v. Kentucky, 136 U. S. 479 (1890) ; Henderson Bridge Co. v.
City of Henderson, 173 U. S. 592 (1899).
2 State v. Cooper, 93 N. J. Law 13, 107 A. 149 (1919).
16 C. J. Sec. 215, n. 99.
"See Note to Roberts v. Fullerton, 117 Wics. 222, 65 L. R. A. 953, 959.
' This was true of Washington and Oregon, as to the Columbia River;
Minnesota and Wisconsin as to the Mississippi; Iowa and Illinois, as to
the Mississippi; and Iowa and Nebraska, as to the Missouri River. See
Nielsen v. Oregon, 212 U. S. 315 (1909) ; Miller v. McLaughlin, 231 U. S.
261 (1930).
" The Supreme Court of Mississippi held in 1912 on a question of criminal
jurisdiction as between Arkansas and Mississippi over a crime committed
on the Mississippi River, that where the act is a crime in both states, the
state first acquiring jurisdiction shall conduct the prosecution to its final
termination; and it is a bar to any further proceedings in the courts of
the other state, State v. Cunningham, 102 Miss. 237, 59 So. 76 (1912).
17 Supra, n. 43, 953.
's
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territory of Maryland. It is clearly proper for a state to
punish crime within its borders, whether on land or river.
Nevertheless, in contrast to Maryland's position, under
the Constitution of Indiana and the Act of Virginia of 1789
erecting the district of Kentucky into an independent state,
the state of Indiana is given civil and criminal concurrent
jurisdiction over the Ohio although Kentucky owns the entire river."' The states of Ohio and Virginia have concurrent jurisdiction of crimes and offenses committed on the
Ohio River although the boundary of Ohio is the northeast
side of the river.49 The United States Circuit Court for
the District of Oregon in the case of In re Mattson" held
that "concurrent jurisdiction between states separated by
navigable rivers is an established rule in this government,
although in some instances the entire river is within the
territorial limits of one state.... It is 5a practical necessity
in the administration of government". 1
Yet, by interstate compact between New York and New
Jersey approved by Congress in 1834, the middle of the
Hudson River is the territorial boundary between these
two states, but in Article 3 of the Compact, New York was
granted the exclusive criminal jurisdiction over the waters
to the low water mark on the New Jersey shore.5 2 The
Court of Appeals of New York has held that this agreement "wisely considered the necessities of the case, the welfare of the two states, the exigencies of commerce, the interests of the city and port of New York in particular in
whose prosperity, as the metropolis of the country. New
Jersey had a common interest, required that there should
be a unity of control over such waters and a single and
exclusive jurisdiction exercised over them by one of the
said states".53
In any event, there could be less attack on Maryland's
exercising exclusive criminal jurisdiction over the Potomac
when her territorial limits include the whole river. In
addition, the long acquiescence of Virginia to the exercise
of exclusive common law, and later statutory criminal
jurisdiction over the river by Maryland, the absence of any
," Welsh v. State, 126 Ind. 71, 25 N. E. 883 (1890).
40

Booth v. Hubbard, 8 Ohio St. Rep. 244, 249 (1858).

50 69 Fed. 535 (C. C. D. Oregon, 1895).

5 Supra, n. 50, 537.
51 In re Devoe Manufg. Co., 108 U. S. 401 (1883).
51 People v. Central R. R. Co. of N. J., 42 N. Y. Rep. 283, 295 (1870).
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court in Virginia with power to try such crimes as in the
instant case which occur on the river, can only be regarded
as a general recognition between the two states of Maryland's right which should not be disturbed.5 4
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT
CONTAINING LIQUIDATED
DAMAGE CLAUSE
Armstrong v. Stifler'
Specific performance was sought by the buyers of an
option agreement to sell ten shares of stock in a dairy
company at $300. per share. The contract, signed by defendant, contained the following provisions: "In case of
default, I promise to pay $300. per share ...as liquidated
damages." Plaintiffs secured similar option agreements
from the holders of more than a majority of the outstanding
shares of the Company, with the purpose of securing control
of the corporation but holders of less than one-third of
such shares had transferred their stock to the plaintiffs,
the remaining optionors, including the defendant, having
refused to make the transfers promised. On defendant's
appeal from an order overruling a demurrer to the bill of
complaint, held:-Affirmed; plaintiff's bill stated a case
justifying equitable relief.
Defendant raised two principal contentions in support
of his demurrer, viz:- (1) that a contract for the purpose
of securing control of a corporation is not specifically en6,On May 13, 1948, the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit,
reversed a judgment by the jury in the U. S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia which had awarded $56,000 in damages to the
victim of the crime in the instant case, her husband, and a fellow passenger.
The civil action for damages had been brought against defendants
Dichmann, Wright, and Pugh, Incorporated, operators of the steamboat on
which the felony occurred, who were under contract with the War Shipping Administration. The theory of the case was that Dichmann as a common carrier owed to the plaintiffs as passengers the duty to use the
utmost or highest degree of practicable care and diligence in the selection
and supervision of members of its crew and the carrying of the passengers safely to their destination.
Following the U. S. Supreme Court decision In the case of Caldarola
v. Eckert, 332 U. S. 155, June 23, 1947, the Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
that the general agency contract between the United States which owned
the vessel and the defendants, specifically provided in Articles 1 and
3A(d) that the defendants were agents of the United States; that while
they were appointed to manage and conduct the business of the vessel, this
did not place them in the position of owners pro hac vice in possession or
control of the vessel so as to make them liable to the plaintiffs. Judgment
was entered exonerating the defendants of liability.
1
56 A. (2d) 808 (Md. 1948).

